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ABSTRACT 
Although GSFC policy has required both a prototype (qualification 
model) and a flight (acceptance model) spacecraft, rising costs have 
caused a reexamination of this approach. In  both the  Interplanetary 
Monitoring Platform (IMP) and the Radio Astronomy Explorer (RAE) 
projects, a single spacecraft (termed proto-flight) was qualified and 
then  successfully  launched.  The  analysis  discussed  herein  was con- 
ducted,  using Monte Carlo  techniques,  to  estimate  whether  this  concept 
is truly  cost-effective.  The  results of the  study  show a savings of 
approximately $1 million,  using  the  proto-flight  approach. It also  shows 
that  rigorous  subsystem  testing is effective  in  reducing  costs i f  initial 
hardware quality is poor. The analysis reported herein assumes that 
each test approach  treated  produces  equivalent  spacecraft  launch- 
readiness. Whether this assumption is t rue has  not been determined; 
however, it could be expected to have some limitations. 
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TEST PLAN OPTIMIZATION FOR AN 
EXPLORER-SIZE SPACECRAFT 
by 
J. H. Boeckel and A. R. Timmins 
Goddavd Space Flight  Center 
INTRODUCTION 
The  test philosophy a t  Goddard  Space  Flight  Center  has always emphasized  complete 
spacecraft  systems  tests as a final  check  to  demonstrate  that  the  spacecraft is ready  for launch. 
However, project  managers have had considerable  flexibility  in conducting their  programs.  This 
has  resulted  in a minor  amount of subsystem  testing  in  some  programs and substantial  subsystem 
testing i n  others. In addition,  the  number of spacecraft  in  each  program has vaned  considerably. 
Usually, a new program has included  an  engineering  model, a prototype  model,  and two flight 
model spacecraft. In a subsequent  launch  in  the  same  program,  the  number of spacecraft  to be 
tested was reduced. A s  the funds available  for a complete  program  declined, it was  necessary to 
investigate ways to reduce  costs. One approach was  the  use of a so-called  "proto-flight"  space- 
craft.  This  approach  used a single  spacecraft  that was tested  to  prototype  levels  and  subsequently 
launched.  The  Interplanetary  Monitoring  Platform  (IMP)  project  personnel  pioneered  the  use of a 
single  spacecraft.  However,  questions on its  performance  relative  to  other  test  approaches could 
not  be answered on the basis of only  one trial. The  present  study  provides  information for judging 
comparative  performance. 
The amount of hardware  purchased is a basic  determinant of program  cost.  Other  factors 
such as amount  and level of subsystem  testing,  combinations of subsystem and systems  tests,  de- 
lays, and levels of hardware  quality  also  affect  costs.  Because of the  effects of these  factors, it 
became  desirable  to study different  ways of conducting a test and evaluation  program  from  the 
standpoints of cost and reliability,  taking  into  account  the  expected  variability  in  hardware  quality. 
Because of the  large  number of interacting  factors,  such a study  cannot  be  based upon a single 
program  or a small  number of spacecraft;  experience with  one o r  two specific  projects  does not 
provide  an  adequate  guide  concerning  the  costs  involved. For adequate  comparison, a large 
number of programs  must be  available  for  analysis. To provide  such a basis, a mathematical 
cost model was developed  in which the  variables of cost,  time, hardware quality,  and test effective- 
ness could be studied,  using  large  sample-sizes  generated  in a computer  program, the General 
Purpose  Systems  Simulator (GPSS 111). This  program  permitted  the  observation of total  cost 
variation as caused by the  random  occurrence of failures and delays  in a large  number of "proj- 
ects" conducted  under a given  philosophy. 
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THE COST MODEL 
The GPSS 111, as adapted for  the  present  purpose,  runs 2000 spacecraft  programs  using 
Monte Carlo  techniques.  Each  step  in  the  testing  uses a probability  distribution for selected 
failure rates. The  output of the GPSS III is a distribution of cost  and  time  for  each of the six 
phases of a project life cycle as follows: 
Phase I Development  and  Fabrication 
Phase I1 Subsystem Test 
Phase ID Integration 
Phase IV System Test 
Phase V Prelaunch 
Phase VI Space Flight 
The  inputs  to  the  cost  model  may  be  varied as desired.  Details of the  cost model are  presented 
in Appendix A. 
This  investigation  concerns  an  Explorer-size  spacecraft  program,  i.e., a spacecraft weighing 
up to  approximately 500 pounds  and  launched by a Delta  vehicle.  Even with this  limitation,  one 
quickly  recognizes that there is a considerable  variation  in  total  project  costs within an  Explorer 
program.  This  variation is accommodated by the  cost model. 
Since  historical  cost  data  were not available  in  the  form  necessary  for  use  in  the  model,  the 
costs  used  are  the  best  engineering  judgments  available with respect to each of the  phases. 
Total  program  costs  derived  compare  favorably with experience on  typical  explorer  projects  such 
as IMP F&G ($7.5 million  each)  and RAE-A ($8.1 million). 
SCOPE OF STUDY 
Table 1 lists failure  data  from  the  systems tests of six IMP spacecraft. It shows  that  the 
probability of failure of a particular  subsystem  ranged  from 0.1 to 0.5. This  result  provides a 
basis for assuming  the failure probability  in  systems  tests  in  the model. 
Table 1 
Failure Data From Systems Tests of IMP Spacecraft. ' 
IMP  spacecraft 
A - Prototype 
B - Flight 
C - Flight 
D - Flight 
E - Flight 
F - Proto-flight 
'No. of subsystems 
No. of experiments 
Total units 
Example for Pf = 
s 29 
Number of failures Probability 
Subsystems Of pf, Experiments 
7 4 0.4 
4 
0.2 3 3 
0.4 7 5 
0.5 6 8 
0.1 1 1 
0.2* 1 
20 
9 
29 
-
= 0.17 . 
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The  variables  studied  included  hardware  quality,  subsystem test effectiveness,  subsystem 
and  system  test  failure  probability,  and  test plan. The  range of each  variable  was as follows: 
1. Hardware quality: 0.25 to 0.95 failure probability 
2. Systems test fai lure  probabilities: 0.07 to 0.90 
3. Subsystem test failure probabilities: 0.03 to 0.73 
4. Ratio of subsystem-to-system test effectiveness: 0.2 to 1.0 
5. Test  plans: three 
Table  2 lists the  matrix and  specified  values  used  for all the  variables. One premise  used  in 
setting up Table 2 was  that  testing did not eliminate all failures in a spacecraft. A conservative 
space failure rate  residual of 0.05 per  subsystem was used. For  instance, with a hardware  failure 
probability of 0.95, the combined failure  probability  in  subsystem and system  testing was 0.90. 
Three  cases  were  studied  to  examine  the  effect of the test  plan  on  total  project  costs.  Equal 
quantities of subsystem hardware were provided for each case. The three cases were as 
follows: 
1. Case I - Two complete  sets of subsystems  were  tested as subsystems. One set  was 
integrated  into a flight  spacecraft  that w a s  tested  at  prototype  levels. No backup spacecraft was 
provided. 
2.  Case 11 - No subsystem  tests  were  performed. One prototype and one flight spacecraft 
were  subjected to  environmental  tests. 
3. Case III - One set of subsystems  was  subjected  to  environmental  tests and integrated  into 
a prototype  spacecraft.  The  flight  spacecraft  used  subsystems that  had not been  subjected  to 
environmental  test. Both spacecraft  systems  were  subjected  to  environmental  tests. 
Subsystem  test  effectiveness was studied  at  three  levels. 
1. Good - The  subsystem  test w a s  made equal to the  system  test  in  effectiveness. 
2. Medium - The  subsystem  test was made one-half as effective as the  systems  test. 
3. Poor - The  subsystem  test was made one-fifth as effective as the  systems  test. 
A s  indicated i n  Table 2, t h i s  parameter  was  investigated  at  three  levels  under  Case I only. 
The  effect of systems  test  failure  probability on the  cost  to  launch  was  studied as a function 
of hardware  quality  and  test  plan.  The  matrix  includes  the  effect of prior  subsystem  tests on the 
system  test  failure  probability. 
Each  computer  run  provides 25 tables of data.  Each  table  gives  the  distribution of the  results 
of 2000 spacecraft  programs with respect  to  time,  cost, or frequency of some  part of the life 
cycle of the program.  Approximately 20 individual cases  were  run for the purpose of th i s  study. 
It is clear  that  many  comparisons and analyses  can be  made  from  the  available data. For 
example,  test  costs  could  be  examined  separately. 
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Hardware  quality 
(Pp = probability 
of failure) 
0.95 
0.75 
0.50 
0.25 
Failure  probability 
in  test  (Pf ) 
ss = subsystem test; 
s = system  test 
Pf 
Pf 
5 5  
Pf 
s s  
Pf 
pf 
Pf 
S S  
Table 2 
Summary of Variables  Investigated. 
Case I 
Two sets of subsystems and 
me  spacecraft  (proto-flight) 
Subsystem  Test 
Effectiveness 
Good* Poor* Medium* 
0.73 0.18 0.43 
0.17 0.72 0.47 
0.56 0.13 0.33 
0.14 0.57 0.37 
0.34 0.08 0.21 
0.11 0.37 0.24 
0.13 0.03 0.08 
0.07 0.17 0.12 
Test  Plan 
Case I1 Case I11 
No. subsystem  tests; 
one prototype and  one flight one prototype and  one 
One set  of subsystem  tests: 
flight  spacecraft spacecraft 
I I I 
Prototype Flight Prototype Flight 
spacecraft I spacecraft 1 spacecraft I spacecraft 
1 
0.20 1 0.07 1 0.12 1 0.07 
*Good - Subsystem tests equal to systems tests in effectiveness 
Medium - Subsystem tests one-half a s  effective 
Poor - Subsystem tests one-fifth as effective. 
For  the  purpose of this study,  the  criterion  used for comparison of the  many  variables is the 
cost  to launch. This  criterion is the  most  important  one  from  the  standpoint of the  project 
manager  since  his  interest is not served by minimizing  costs of one phase of the  program if it 
does not  provide a savings  for  the  overall  program. 
RESULTS OF STUDY 
Subsystem  Test  Effectiveness 
Figure 1 presents data on the  relationship of subsystem test effectiveness  to  hardware  quality 
and  the  mean  cost  to  launch.  For  this  part of the  study,  one set  of subsystems and one spacecraft 
were the basis for the cost data. With good 
hardware  (failure  probability, P, = 0.25), vari- 
ations i n  subsystem  test  effectiveness  caused 
no significant difference in the mean cost to 
launch. With fair hardware  (failure  probability 
of 0.5), the  difference  between a good subsys- 
tem  test and a poor subsystem test amounted 
to  approximately $180,000 i n  the  mean  cost  to 
launch. Inability to find faults at the subsys- 
tem level delayed their discovery until sys-  
tems  tests  were conducted. As the number of 
failures found in  the  more  costly  systems  test 
increased,  the  mean  cost  to  launch  increased. 
With very poor hardware (failure probability 
of 0.95) the  subsystem  test  effectiveness could 
make  adifference of $60Q,000in  the  mean  cost 
to launch. 
Test  Plan 
1.orJL” - 
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4.4 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.2 
MEAN COST TO L A U N C H  ( m i l l i o n s  of do l lars)  
N o t e :  GOOD - Subsystems  tests equal to systems  tests in effect iveness. 
MEDIUM - Subsystem tests ha l f  as ef fect ive.  
POOR - Subsystem  tests one  f i f th as ef fect ive.  
Figure 1-Effect of hardware quality and subsystem test 
effectiveness on cost to launch, based on a test plan for 
one  set o f  subsystems and  one  Explorer  spacecraft. 
Subsystem  test  effectiveness  compared to systems  test  effectiveness is influenced by the 
adequacy of system  interface  simulation as well as by the  comparative  duration of the two tests. 
The  normal  subsystem  test  time  for a prototype  subsystem  test  in  an  Explorer-type  program is 
2 days for a thermal-vacuum  test,  compared  to  about 13 days  (Reference 1) for a systems  test. 
These  considerations,  in  addition  to a separate  study of subsystem  tests  (Reference 2), resulted 
in  using  the  “medium”  subsystem test effectiveness  in  Figure 1 as being representative of the 
subsystem  test  effectiveness at Goddard  Space  Flight  Center. 
Three test plans,  identified as Case I, II, and 111 in  Table 2, were  investigated.  Figure 2 shows 
the effect of hardware  quality  and test plan  on the mean  cost to launch. Case I is more  economical 
under all circumstances  investigated. With good hardware  quality, Case I is more  economical 
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than  Case II or 111 by $850,000,  and the  cost CASE I 
savings  increase as the hardware quality de- 
creases. If hardware  quality is very  poor 
(failure probability of 0.95) the cost savings of $ 
2 SETS OF SUBSYSTEMS 
1 FLIGHT SPACECRAFT 
Case I increases  to $1.1 million  compared  to 
Case III and $1.6 million  compared  to  Case II. CASE Ill 1 SET OF SUBSYSTEM TESTS 
Y 
0.6 1 PROTOTYPE AND 
Test  Costs CASE I I  
Two of the principal  cost  inputsfor  the 1 FLIGHT SPACECRAFT 
N O  SUBSYSTEM TESTS 
1 PROTOTYPE AND 
three  cases  are the  subsystem  and  system  test 
costs.  These  costs  were  examined  extensively 
as a function of test effectiveness and hard- 
ware  quality,  and  the  results  were  summarized 
in  Figure 3. With very poor hardware,  the Figure  2-Effect of hardware  quality  cnd test plan on 
need for a highly effective subsystem test is 
evident. In the most extreme case shown, the 
cost  savings  may  amount  to $1.75 million  for  an  effectiveness  ratio of 1.0 compared  to 0.2. With 
good hardware,  the  cost  savings of good subsystems  testing  becomes  relatively  small. 
6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 
MEAN COST TO LAUNCH (millions of dollars) 
cost to launch. 
Hardware  Quality 
Figures 1 and 2 show decreased  program  costs  for  improved  hardware quality. However, t he  
model  does not assign a cost  penalty  for  improved  quality.  It is an  independent  variable  and 
"comes for free". In reality, however, quality increases cost. There are two attacks on the 
quality  problem: 
1. Standard quality assurance through workmanship, documentation, and design review. 
2. Pretesting  under  environmental  stress  before  initiating  the  formal  test  program. 
Either of these  approaches  costs money. A s  indicated  in  Figure 2, the  maximum  benefit  to 
be  obtained  through  improved  quality is approximately $1 million  for  this model program.  There- 
fore,  extra  quality  assurance  and  pretest  are not cost-effective if  they cost  more  than $1 million. 
However,  one must  recognize  that  some  types of failures may  escape  detection by present  test 
methods  and  can  be  eliminated  only  through  quality  assurance  measures. 
Test  Delays 
Another  consideration  in  determining  the  best  test  plan is the  time  required  to  complete  the 
program.  Delays  may be caused by late  delivery of hardware,  failures i n  subsystem and system 
testing, and unavailability of subsystems  to  complete  integration or  delivery  to  the  launch  site. 
These  delays  were  combined  for  study as follows: 
1. All delays up to  the  start of systems tests 
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Figure  3-Effect  of subsystem-to-system test effectiveness rat io on test costs for several levels of hardware 
quality, based on  one  set of subsystems and  one  spacecraft. 
2. Delays caused by system  test  failures 
3. Delays  in  shipping  to  the  launch  site  because one or  two subsystems had not arrived. 
The  three  types of delays are depicted  in  Figure 4 as a function of test  effectiveness and hardware 
quality. Figure 4 shows: 
1. The  delays  preceding  the  start of system  tests  are not very  sensitive  to  variation  in  hard- 
ware  quality,  and less sensitive  to R (ratio of subsystem-to-system  test  effectiveness). 
2. The  delay  in  system  tests  can  vary  significantly, depending principally on hardware 
quality. For  a representative R value of 0.5, there could be 14 weeks of delay  for  very  poor  hard- 
ware,  compared to 4 weeks  for good hardware. 
3. The llgoodl' subsystem  test  effectiveness  ratio  causes  larger  delays  in  shipping  to  the 
launch  site.  This  results  from  the  ground rule  that  system tests begin when 23 of 25 subsystems 
have  been  integrated.  Thus,  the  system  test  may  be  completed  before  the last two subsystems 
have  completed  their  subsystems tests. The  chances of this happening increase with an  increase 
in R. 
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Variation From Mean -Costs 
The  data  presented  thus far have  been  cited on the  basis of the  mean  cost to launch.  However, 
for a specific  program,  the  cost  to  launch  could  vary  from  the  mean,  depending on chance. In 
order  to  make  the  best  program  decisions, a project  manager  needs  to know how much  chance 
alone  might  affect  his  program.  The  cost  model  provides  such  information by giving  frequency/ 
cost  distributions  for  each  phase of the life cycle.  Figure 5 is an  example of such a distribution. 
D E L A Y  IN SHIPPING 
T O  LAUNCH SITE 
_t 0.2 
SYSTEMS TESTS 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
o’L’ SYSTEMS TESTS DELAYS BEFORE 
gu I / /  
I I I I I I 1 
5 IO 15 20 25 30 35 
T I M E   ( w e e k s )  
TEST  EFFECTIVENESS: 
Good .-e Subsystem test  equal ly  e f fect ive as system  test. 
M e d i u m  1-1-1 Subsystem test 1/2 as e f f e c t i v e  as  system test. 
Poor O ” O ” a  Subsystem  test 1/5 as  e f f e c t i v e  as system  test. 
Figure 4-Summary of  delays i n  a  spacecraft  program as a 
function  of  hardware  quality  and  test  effectiveness. 
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Figure  5-Distribution  of cost to  launch  for 2000 space- 
craft based on a test plan using one spacecraft and one 
set of subsystems (Pf = 0.33, Pf = 0.37). 
5 5  
For instance,  the  cost  to  launch would not  exceed $4.6 million  (for  the  variables  listed)  for 50 per- 
cent of the  time  and would not  exceed $5.20 million for 95 percent of the  time.  This kind of vari- 
ation exists even  though  the  following  variables  were  fixed: 
1. Test plan-one spacecraft and one set  of subsystems 
2. System test failure probability-P, = 0.37 
3. Subsystem test  failure probability-P, = 0.33. 
5 
S S  
The  main  point is that  each  program is unique,  and we are trying  to  determine  the  probabilities 
for  the  cost to be  within  certain bounds. 
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Comparison of  50-Percent and 
95-Percent Values o f  Cost  to launch 
When mean  values of cost  to  launch are used,  the test plan  identified as Case I is more eco- 
nomical  in all cases.  To  gain  further  insight  into  the  three test plans,  the  50-percent  values of 
the  cost  to  launch  were  compared with the  95-percent  values.  Table 3 gives  this  comparison. It 
shows  again  that  Case I is superior  in all instances  to  Case 11 and  Case III. In fact, the extreme 
values (95 percent  values)  for  Case I are less than  the  mean  values  for  Cases 11 and III. Further, 
Case I is affected less by hardware  quality  than  Case 11 and  Case ID. Also,  the  cost  to  launch is 
a, more sensitive to the test plan than it is to hardware quality. 
Table 3 
Cost To Launch In Thousands of Dollars. 
I 
.. 
Hardware 
Quality 
Very poor 
Poor 
Fa i r  
Good 
~ ". 
c o s t  to 
Launch 
a s  % of 
$7137 
- ~- 
Pf 
0.95 
0.75 
0.50 
0.25 
.~ - 
0.95 
0.75 
0.50 
0.25 
l r 
- "_ 
Mean values 
Case no. 
" -  
~~ -~ ~ 
I B* 
7726 
7525 
7310 
7137 
~~ ~ 
~~ 
108 
10  5 
103 
100 
.ation o 
~ 
I1 
9324 
8839 
8342 
8005 
1 3 1  
124 
117 
112 
:ases Ig. 
I11 
8819 
8539 
8240 
7980 
123 
119 
115 
112 
and 111 
I t I 
95% values 
Case no. 
111 132 
109 
- 
I11 
- 
9891 
9502 
9295 
9015 
- 
138 
133 
130 
126 
-
Relative Costs o f  Program Phases 
The  relative  costs  (Table 4) are   based on one  spacecraft and one set  of subsystems.  The 
minimum  and  maximum  values are  taken  from  the  spread of the  mean  values of the  cases  covered 
in  this study. Using the  foregoing  representative  figures,  the  phase I costs are shown  to  be greater 
Table 4 
Relative  Costs of Program  Phases. 
r 
Phase 
-~ 
I Research,  development,  and  fabrication 
I1 Subsystem test 
I11 Integration 
IV System  test 
V Prelaunch 
~ .. . . .. . ~- 
Cost  (Thousands of dollars) 
Minimum 
2500 
208 
380 
412 
155 
~ 
Maximum 
270G 
427 
840 
1835 
225 
Representative 
2 600 
320 
610 
1150 
190 
9 
than  any  other  phase.  These  data  are for one set of subsystems.  All  programs  to  date have used 
at least  two sets of subsystems;  thus a more  representative  value for phase I would be $5  million. 
The  cost  assumptions  used  in  the  model would have to be in   e r ror  by orders  of magnitude  to 
change  the  conclusion  that  phase I offers  the  greatest  potential  for  maximum  cost  savings.  Another 
self-evident  conclusion is that  the  cost of integrating a second  spacecraft  can  be  traded for testing 
two  complete sets of subsystems.  The  subsystem and system test phases  also  offer  cost  savings 
possibilities,  mainly  through  improvement of hardware  quality.  This  analysis  shows  that  the 
system  test  cost  can be  minimized by the use of a single  spacecraft  in conjunction  with the com- 
plete  testing of two sets of subsystems. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The  cost model is useful  in  developing  comparison  data,  using a large  sample to  investi- 
gate  the  effects of varying  hardware  quality,  the  test  program  plan, and test  effectiveness. 
2. The  cost model  shows  that  the  most  economical way to  conduct  an  evaluation  program  on 
an  Explorer-type  spacecraft is to  use a test  plan  that  requires  one  spacecraft with two sets  of 
subsystems. 
3. The  cost  saving  from  an  effective  subsystem  test  program  decreases as hardware  quality 
improves. 
4. There is a clear  limit  to  the  cost  savings  that  can be achieved by improving  hardware 
quality prior  to  the  spacecraft  testing. 
FURTHER WORK 
A s  discussed  earlier,  it   has been assumed  throughout  this  study  that all programs  resulted  in 
equivalent  performance  after launch.  However,  there are  insufficient  flight  data  to  make a judg- 
ment.  Therefore,  it is desirable to investigate a range of possible situations. Such a n  investi- 
gation,  however, would require an acceptable  cost  model  for  the  impact of a failure  in  space  to 
serve as a basis  for  comparison between programs.  This  phase of the  analysis will require con- 
siderable  development  and  input  from  scientists and managers. 
Goddard Space Flight Ccnter 
Kational Aeronautics and Space .4dministration 
Greenbelt, Maryland, December 10. 1968 
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Appendix A 
The Spacecraft Test Program Simulator 
Introduction 
Estimating  the  effect of various test philosophies on program  cost  requires a model of a 
spacecraft  program.  The following discussion  describes  the model  chosen  and  the  manipulations 
introduced.  The  mathematical  modeling  technique  used is described  in  the  General  Purpose  Sys- 
tems  Simulator III Users Manual (IBM Application Program H20-0163-1). With this  tool, it was 
possible  to  simulate 2000 repetitions of each  spacecraft  program conducted  with a given  quality of 
hardware and under a given  test  philosophy but  with variability  in  delay of hardware  arrival,  inte- 
gration, and test  effectiveness.  Thus  variability  in  resultant  cost could  be  observed  for a given 
set  of input  data. 
The Spacecraft Program 
A spacecraft of the  Explorer  class was  chosen  for  analysis.  It  consisted of approximately 25 
subsystems of which 11 were  considered  to be  scientific  experiments.  Each  subsystem was put 
through a simulated  life-cycle of fabrication,  integration, and testing by means of Monte Carlo 
techniques on a digital  computer.  (The Monte Carlo method consists of the  use of random  numbers 
to  provide  an  artificial  world of experience,  based on assumed  probability  distributions  for input 
variables, which is used  for  testing  proposed  operational  schemes.)  There are numerous  possi- 
bilities  at  nearly  every  step  in  this life cycle.  For  example, a subsystem  may f a i l  in  systems 
tests with a probability of 0.25. Therefore, a n  average of one-fourth of the  subsystems i n  the 
spacecraft will f a i l .  However, on a particular  spacecraft,  there is a finite (though small)  proba- 
bility  that all subsystems  might f a i l  o r  that none might f a i l ,  in  accord with .the laws of chance. 
Thus  the  results of a total  program  can  vary widely,  depending on chance  although  the  input as- 
sumptions of arrival  distributions and failure  probabilities  are held  constant.  To  study this vari- 
ation, 2000 simulated  programs  were  run  for  each  set of input  assumptions.  The  final results of 
these 2000 programs  gave a distribution of possible  costs  related  to  the  particular  assumptions 
used. 
The model program  emphasizes  the  test  phase of the  spacecraft  program. Nominal durations 
for  life  cycle  phases  before  the  introduction of variability,  failure, and delays are shown in 
Table  Al. 
11 
A secondary  output of the  analysis,  in  ad- 
dition  to  program  cost, is the  delay  in  each of 
these phases as a function of the initial as- 
sumptions  made  on  hardware  quality,  test ef- 
fectiveness, and test philosophy. 
Development/Fabrication 
The  nominal  timeduration  chosen  for this 
phase  was 40 weeks.  However,  experience 
shows that simultaneous, on-time arrival of 
all subsystems is very unlikely. The distri- 
bution chosen to represent  the  delay was  log- 
Table A1 
Project  Life  Cycle. 
Phase 
Development/fabrication 
Subsystem  test 
Integration 
System  test 
Prelaunch 
Nominal time  (weeks) 
40 
4 
6 
8 
4 
Time  to  launch I 62 
normal,  truncated  at 50 weeks of delay.  This  means  that no subsystem  ever  arrives ahead of 
schedule,  the  vast  majority (85 percent)  are no more  than 20 weeks  late, and none are   l a te r  than 
50 weeks. It was  assumed  that disasters represented by schedule  slippages of more than 1 year 
would be  corrected by a detis  ex 71znchim that  could not be interpreted  mathematically.  The 
actual  distribution  used had a mean  delay of 12-1/2 weeks, and 99 percent of the items  were  in- 
cluded  before  the end of 50 weeks. 
The  cost of each  subsystem was computed at $2000 per week,  uniformly for  each  subsystem. 
This  cost would actually  vary  among  subsystems  during  design and fabrication. However, it was 
felt  that  this  variation would not  have a significant  effect  on  the  interpretation of test  philosophy 
changes. 
Subsystem 
After a subsystem  was  delivered, it was subjected  to  subsystem  testing,  nominally a 4-week 
phase. These tests were not defined further; however, the failure probability (Pf ) in these tests 
was a major input variable to the analysis. The Pf is a function of two factors-the quality of 
the  hardware as delivered and the  effectiveness of the  test.  Hardware  quality is defined as the 
probability (Pf )  that  the  specific  subsystem will f a i l  catastrophically at some  time  before  the 
spacecraft  mission is complete. Test  effectiveness is the  ability of the  test  to find  the  inherent 
flaw,  i.e., ESS - /Pf . When a subsystem  failed, it was  repaired (3 weeks) and retested (2 
weeks).  The  probability of failure  in  the second test  varied  also but was  always  set at one-third 
of the initial  failure  probability. When a second  failure  did  occur,  the  subsystem was again re- 
paired (3 weeks) and retested (2 weeks).  It was assumed that it  always  passed  the  third  test.  This 
truncation by guaranteed  success  does not conform  to  real  life, but it  was  suitable  for  the  purpose. 
Subsystems  tests  cost $2000 per week for  each  subsystem  for both testing and repair  time.  The 
rate  per week includes all project  costs. 
s s  
s s  
- P f S s  
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Integration 
The  nominal  program  calls  for  simultaneous  delivery of all subsystems;  however, as dis- 
cussed earlier, this does not happen. The  model,  therefore,  begins  integration when 13  subsystems 
are available  and  continues  for 6 weeks  or  until 23 subsystems  arrive. It is assumed  that  the 
23rd  subsystem  can  be  integrated  in  zero  time. If the last two subsystems  arrive  during  systems 
tests, no delay is charged; i f  they arrive after systems tests are complete,  shipment  to the launch 
site is delayed.  This  delay is charged at a rate of $40,000 per  week, as is the integration itself. 
The rate per  week, as in  the  case of the  subsystem tests, includes all project  costs. 
Systems  Test 
Systems tests begin after integration is completed.  The  nominal  time  for these tests is 8 
weeks;  however,  their  completion is usually  delayed by failures. During systems  tests,  each  sub- 
system is considered  to  have  the  same  probability of failure P, . This  value is variable  in  the 
model.  Its  magnitude  depends  on  initial  hardware  quality,  the  effectiveness of the  prior  subsystem 
tests in  correcting  faults, and the  residual  failure  rate  remaining  in  space.  Thus  system  test 
effectiveness is given by 
5 
In manipulating  the  model,  the  effectiveness of systems  tests  was  always  chosen as equal  to, or 
greater than,  subsystem  test  effectiveness.  The  ratio E ga /Es  was varied  from 1.0 to 0.2. The 
latter  case  represents  rather  cursory  subsystem  testing  that would require  the  isolation of most 
faults at the  systems  test  level. 
When failures did occur, they were  categorized  such  that  one-third  required a retest  of the 
system (Type A), and two-thirds  were "quick-fix" without retest (Type B). Type A failures, which 
added 2 weeks  each  to  the  systems  test  time had a failure probability of P, /2 in  the  retest  for 
the  particular  subsystem  in  question. If another  failure  occurred,  another 2-week delay was 
incurred, and the failure probability  was P,, /4 in  the  retest. If a failure  occurred  in t h i s  test, 
another 2-week delay  was  charged, but it was  assumed that the fourth  test  was  always  successful. 
Type B failures (quick-fix)  added 1 week  each  to  the  systems  test  time  for  repair but  did  not 
require retest. 
5 
Systems  testing  was  charged  at a rate of $40,000 per week. A s  before, the rate  per week 
includes all project  costs. 
Shipment Delay 
A s  discussed earlier, the model permitted  systems tests to  be  performed with  two subsys- 
tems  missing. However, shipping to  the  launch site was  delayed  until  they  arrived. This delay 
was  charged at $40,000 per week. 
13 
. .  . .  
I 
Prelaunch 
The  nominal  time  duration  at  the  launch site was set at 4 weeks.  Provision  was also made 
for  failures  in  this  phase;  they  remained  constant at 0.03. One  week of delay  was  charged  for 
each failure at a cost   per week of $40,000. 
Space Flight 
The model provides for treating  variable  failure  rates  in  space and a method of interpreting 
these  failures  in  terms of cost. However, i t  is difficult  to  obtain a general  agreement on this 
matter. In this  analysis,  it  was  assumed  that  every  test  philosophy  analyzed  produced  equal  re- 
sults  in  terms of finding inherent  failures.  Therefore,  "cost  in  space" was the  same  for  each 
approach, and only "cost  to  launch" has  been treated. Hopefully it  will  become  possible  to  obtain 
agreement on the  cost of failures i n  space and on the  relative  effectiveness of varying  test 
philosophies so that  the analysis can be extended  to  cover  this  aspect of total  program  cost. 
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